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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SUPERIOR RECEIVABLE SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
CaseNo.:20070095-CA
JAMES E. PETT,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
SUPERIOR RECEIVABLE SERVICES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a debt collection case.
Plaintiff/Appellee, Superior Receivable Services ("Superior") moved for
summary judgment, supported by the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins ("Gittins
Affidavit") with exhibits. R. 29-35. On August 17, 2006, Defendant/Appellant,
James E. Pett ("Mr. Pett") responded to the motion and affidavit with a
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memorandum in opposition, R. 36-48, and an affidavit of Mr. Pett ("Pett
Affidavit"). R. 49-51, 54-56. The court issued a memorandum decision, granting
Superior's motion on September 1st. R. 73-74.
On September 5th, Mr. Pett moved to strike the Gittins Affidavit. R. 75-83.
Superior filed an opposition on September 13th. R. 84-86. Mr. Pett never
submitted his motion to strike.
On December 12th, counsel for Superior served on counsel for Mr. Pett a
document titled "Findings, Order, and Judgment," prepared at the Court's
direction in the earlier memorandum decision, granting Superior's motion for
summary judgment. R. 94-96. The court signed the proposed order on December
20th. Id. Also on December 20th Mr. Pett filed objections to the now-signed order.
R. 97-100.
On December 28th, the trial court issued a second memorandum decision,
rejecting Mr. Pett's motion to strike the Gittins Affidavit, addressing Mr. Pett's
"concerns", and effecting a minor amendment to the order. R. 101-105. The
court later signed a follow-up order denying the motion to strike and overruling
the other objections to the previous order. R. 110-12.
Mr. Pett appealed the decision of the trial court granting summary
judgment. R. 113-14.
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STATEMENT OF FACIS
On May 26, 2004, Mr. Pett signed a document titled "Consent and
Conditions of Treatment" ("the Consent") in which he identifies himself as the
father of a patient being admitted to Cache Valley Specialty Hospital for
treatment. R. 30-32, 35. The Consent states in pertinent part the following:
" FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and
supplies rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates and
financial policies in effect at the time of service. . . . I agree to pay
interest fees on any unpaid balance after 60 days of or date of service
at a rate not to exceed 18% apr. If this account is assigned to an
attorney or a collection agency for collection then I agree to pay all
collection agency fees, court costs, and attorney's fees.
4 ASSIGNMENT OF PHYSICIAN BENEFITS: I am aware that
physician services by Radiologist, Pathologist, Anesthesiologist, as
well as medical, surgical and emergency care are not billed by the
hospital but are billed separately. I understand that I am under the
same obligation to those providers as stated in this agreement unless
otherwise agreed to in writing with those providers. I authorize
payment of any medical benefits for such claims to the appropriate
provider.
R, 35 (emphasis supplied).
InterWest Anesthesia Associates ("InterWest") provided anesthesia to Mr.
Pett's child on the day after the Consent was signed. R. 30-33, 35. InterWest
charged $572.00 for these services. R. 30-33. On July 12, 2004, InterWest
credited this account with a $334.62 payment made by Altius, an insurance
company. R 34. Oi l Ji ily 28, 2005, lnk:i West iinnlc (lie fallowing notation on the
account ledger:
3

ALTIUS PAID YOU $514.80 ON 2/25/05. PAYMENT IN FULL
IS DUE IMMEDIATELY. ALTIUS IS RETRACTING THE
PAYMENT MADE TO US. PLEASE CONTACT US IF YOU
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. THANK YOU!
R. 33. On July 31, 2005, InterWest charged this account $334.62 with the
notation: "7/31/2005 REFUND ALTIUS CK 5254." R. 33. No other payments
were made on this account. R. 33-34. More than ten separate finance charges
were posted to this account R. 33-34. Each time a finance charge was posted, a
statement of the account was sent to Mr. Pett. R. 32, ^f 14. On September 1, 2005
a "pre-collect letter" was sent to Mr. Pett. R. 33. On November 11, 2005 the
account was sent to collections with the posting of a charge of $317.57 for that
item. R. 34.
Mr. Pett testified that he: "never signed any agreement with InterWest
Anesthesia;" "never promised to pay InterWest any amount for anything;" "never
even knew that InterWest provided services to any member of [his] family;" "never
knew that InterWest existed until this lawsuit." R. 54. Furthermore, Mr. Pett states
in his affidavit that "I have never signed any contracts or agreements with Superior
for anything, nor would I ever do so." R. 56. Mr. Pett never denied, under oath or
any allegations or pleadings, having signed the Consent. For example, in his
answer, Mr. Pett "affirmatively asserts that 'exhibit A' attached to the plaintiffs
complaint [the Consent] is not an agreement or contract with the plaintiffs
assignor." R. 11. More directly, Mr. Pett admits in the Brief of Appellant (at
4

Pp.25-26) that "he signed the ' Consent and Conditions of Treatment' with Cache
Valley Specialty Hospital."
Mr Pett stated under oath that "I have never received any payment from
Altii is in thefifteei1 years I have been covered by their insurance" and ". . . I never
received $514.80 from Altius on February 25, 2005." R. 55. IS lr. Pel t c lid nc it •
provide any evidence that Altius did or did not pay $334.62 to InterWest or that
InterWest did or did not return the $334.62 payment to Altius. For example, Mr.
Pt-* :';<;ifV.*

• -o way of knowing if Altius paid InterWest S ^ ^ . o - oi. July

12, 2004,..."R. 55.
Mr, Pett testified that "I have never received any bills from InterWest,..."
and "I never received a "pre-collection letter,. . ." R. 55. Mr. Pett provided no
e\ idence that statemei its en a pre -collection lettei < \ ere i lot sei it by InterWest. For
example, Mr. Pett testified "I do not believe any [bills from InterWest] were ever
sent" and "I do not believe any [pre-collection letters] were ever sent." R. 55.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Pett's claims of contests of fact fail because they are either immaterial
or non-existent.
Superior is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because InterWest is a
third-party beneficiary of the contract between Mr. Pett and Cache • ;iey Specialty
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Hospital. There is no duty under this contract or the law for InterWest or Superior
to notify Mr. Pett of an assignment. Mr. Pett is therefore liable for all promises
made under the contract, including interest, costs, collection agency fees, and
attorney's fees. The trial court did not weigh evidence and viewed all evidence in
the light most favorable to Mr. Pett in arriving at its summary judgment
conclusions.
Mr. Pett's motion to strike the Gittins Affidavit was properly rejected as
untimely, coming as it did after Mr. Pett responded to the Gittins Affidavit.
Because Superior was properly awarded attorney's fees below, provision
should be made for an award of Superior's attorney's fees on appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
I.

THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACTS

There is no question under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that if
any material fact is in genuine dispute, summary judgment is precluded. Under
Utah case law (including citations provided by Mr. Pett), it is likewise clear that in
assessing whether a factual dispute exists, the Court must accept all of the supplied
evidence as true, and view all the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Mr. Pett contends that there are three fact-dispute roadblocks that should
6

have detoured Superior from summary judgmei it ' I he trial court examined each of
these focal points, and for good reasons, found Mr. Pett's positions to be without
merit.

A. The Fact that the Principal Balance was $572.00 is Undisputed
Superior supplied evidence that the original (and only) charge for anesthesia
services was $572.00. This evidence was contained in and attached to the
Affida vit of V ' endy Gittins, the officern.an.agerof Inter West, and custodian of its
records, with access to all account information regarding Mr. Pett's accoi n it * vl licl i.
was a business record. Gittins Affidavit ^| 2, R. 29. One of the business records, a
"Patient Ledger Analysis," was attached and incorporated by reference into the
affidavit, Gittins Affidavit^ 4 and. Exhibit R 30, 33 34 1 1 le ledger shows an
entry for the original anesthesia services as a $572.00 charge. R. 33. Ms. Gittins
also testifies directly that such was the original charge. Gittins Affidavit ^[ 4, R. 30.
Because the only payment made on the account was later reversed, it follows from
the evidence tl lat the unpaid principal is still $57.2 00 ' Fhere is no evidence to the
contrary.
Mr. Pett points to two figures he says stand in contradiction to this amount.
In I In; coiiipLiuil. the itemization of amounts owed listed $627.04 as "unpaid
principal/ *•

•

- •••

••

:• ;otverifie<

7

-.•

. • \lence on which a

genuine conflict may be supported. Mr. Pett's perception of a conflict here seems
slightly masochistic, since the principal owed under Ms. Gittins' sworn accounting
is less than the same item as listed in the earlier pleading. (In preparing this brief,
counsel noticed that the judgment incorrectly carried forward the extra $55.04 in
principal. Superior stipulates to correction of the judgment so that the principal is
reduced to $527.00 with corresponding reduction in interest and the total
judgment. This clerical error was not one of Mr. Pett's objections to the trial
court's summary judgment order.)
B. The Fact that the $317.57 was a Collection Charge in addition to the Principal
Balance is Undisputed
The second claimed problem is expressed by Mr. Pett as an assertion that
"only $317.57 was allegedly transferred to Superior for collection. (Record at
34)." Brief of Appellant, p. 8. That record reference is to the second page of the
patient ledger where, in bold the words "Charge Balance: $317.57" appear on the
left just above the last two lines on that page. This entry is not contrary to the
$572.00 principal. Ms. Gittins testified directly that "a collection charge was
added to the account in the amount of $317.57 prior to referral to Superior. Please
see Exhibit A" Gittins Affidavit *f 10, R.30. On the heading of the same page of
the ledger the "Pat. Bal:" and "Total Bal:" are both listed as $952.71. R. 34. On
the previous page a "Charge Balance" of $635.14 is listed. R. 33. Each of the two
"Charge Balances" is associated with a separate "Charge Seq. #" and followed by a
8

series of "Tr

- Seq. #s. R. 33-34. The $317.57 charge balance is followed by

only one transaction, while the $635.14 charge balance is followed by nineteen
transactions. The $317.57 collection charge is 50% of the $635.14 main charge
balai ice, and tl lese t\ v o cl large balances add I lp to the ","*: I otal Bali"1 of $952,71
appearing at the heading of both pages of the ledger. R. 33-34. There is no
mistake or legitimate confusion between the $317.57 collection charge, and the
figure of $572.00 principal.

C. The Fact that the Altius Payment Was Refunded is Undisputed
Superior supplied evidence that Mr. Pett's insurer, Altius, made a payment
to InterWest of $334.62 on July 12, 2004. Gittins Affidavit If 12, Exhibit A, R. 31,
34. i

\

i-

:

irect testimony, as well as a business record, evidencing

InterWest's refund of the $334.62 to Altius with a consequent reversal of the
previous credit. Gittins Affidavit ^f 13, Exhibit A, R. 31, 33.
Three days prior to the refund, InterWest posted on Mr. Pett's account the
reasoi <r>L \

- .: »\'/ * *r "retracting" the payrr

A. 33. Mr Pett takes facti lal

issue with that reasoning. Although Mr. Pett has thereby contested a fact, putting
in question whether he received a $514.80 payment from Altius, that fact does not
matter.
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The rationale for the refund is irrelevant. The refund occurred, making the
net effect the same as if the Altius payment had never been received in the first
place. Mr. Pett says he was not receiving statements, so he was presumably
unaware of either the payment or the refund. Indeed, he testified that he had "no
way of knowing" whether Altius paid InterWest the $334.62 in the first place.
(Mr. Pett could have sought a continuance to conduct discovery under Rule 56(f),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure if he doubted the payment had been refunded and
wanted to obtain evidence to contest that fact.) The trial court recognized,
appropriately, that the reasoning for the refund was not material to the existence or
amount of the debt. R. 102-103.

II. SUPERIOR IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Where the material facts are settled prior to trial, the law must still be
applied to determine if the movant is entitled to summary judgment. Rule 56(c),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Pett argues four legal theories under which he
attempts to pin the trial court with error in granting Superior's motion.
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A. Mr. Pett Owed Contractual Duties to InterWest.
Mr. Pett claims that because his agreement was not with InterWest, he
doesn't owe InterWest. Mr. Pett misunderstands the relationship between Cache
Valley Specialty Hospital ("the Hospital"), himself, and InterWest.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Pett, he did not enter into
a contract with InterWest, made no promises to InterWest, and was oblivious to
InterWest's existence until well after his child was admitted to the Hospital, and
underwent anesthesia as part of her medical treatment. The only healthcare
provider mentioned by name in the Consent is the Hospital. The Consent includes
Mr. Pett's promise to the Hospital to pay for its services, plus interest at 18%, plus
collection agency fees, court costs, and attorney's fees if the account is assigned for
collection. Mr. Pett was thus in privity of contract with the Hospital.
Mr. Pett was not in privity of contract with InterWest. But Mr. Pett
expressly acknowledged in paragraph 1 of his contract with the Hospital, that his
daughter could be provided treatment, including "anesthesia." In paragraph 4 of
his contract with the Hospital, Mr. Pett stated he was "aware that physician
services by . . . Anesthesiologist... are not billed by the hospital but are billed
separately." Mr. Pett also promised that he was "under the same obligation to
those providers as stated in this agreement..." These provisions and promises
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placed InterWest Anesthesia, among others, in the status of third party beneficiary
of the contract between the Hospital and Mr. Pett.
Third-party beneficiaries are "persons who are recognized as having
enforceable rights created in them by a contract to which they are not
parties and for which they give no consideration," 4 Corbin on
Contracts § 774 at 6 (1960). See Mason v. Tooele City, 26 Utah 2d 6,
484 P.2d 153 (1971). For a third-party beneficiary to have a right to
enforce a right, the intention of the contracting parties to confer a
separate and distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear. Clark
v. American Standard, Inc., Utah, 583 P.2d 618 (1978).
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980).
Mr. Pett's discussion and citations regarding assignment thus have no
bearing on InterWest's rights to enforce Mr. Pett's obligations under the Consent.
Superior has not claimed that there was an assignment of the Consent from the
Hospital to InterWest. InterWest did not need an assignment in order to gain rights
under the Consent - InterWest was a beneficiary of the Consent from the moment
Mr. Pett signed it, stating "I understand and accept the terms of this agreement..."

B. Mr. Pett Owes Contract Interest, Collection Agency Fees, and Attorney's Fees
Mr. Pett claims that by virtue of not having received notice of InterWest's or
Superior's involvement before service of the summons, he is not responsible to pay
the 18% interest, attorney's fees, or collection agency fees. His legal citation on
this point is Webb v. Brinkerhoff Construction Co., 972 P.2d 74 (Utah 1988). The
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Consent's clause regarding interest and these other fees dispenses with Mr. Pett's
argument, and the Webb case is distinguishable on additional significant grounds.
Central to Mr. Pett's argument is the notion that "neither InterWest nor
Superior are entitled to simply file suit against Mr. Pett without first notifying Mr.
Pett of the alleged obligation." Brief of Appellant, p.28.
Under the Consent, interest begins accruing at 18% "after 60 days of
discharge or date of service." There is no requirement that notice be given, let
alone that notice be received. Certainly by signing, understanding, and agreeing to
the terms of the Consent, Mr. Pett was notified that interest was running as of July
23, 2004, 60 days after Mr. Pett's daughter received treatment. The agreement
required nothing further. Mr. Pett was contractually responsible to pay "in
accordance with the rates and financial policies in effect at the time of service." He
has not pointed to or even alleged the existence of a financial policy in effect on
May 24, 2004 requiring notice.
With respect to liability for "collection agency fees" and "attorney's fees",
paragraph 2 of the contract does impose one triggering condition: "If this account
is assigned to an attorney or a collection agency for collection." As with interest,
there is no requirement that Mr. Pett receive notice. There is no requirement that
InterWest or anyone else send notice. (As the contract does not require notice, it is
only in passing that Superior notes that InterWest provided, gave, sent to Mr. Pett
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statements "on a regular basis", at least thirteen times, and a "pre-collection letter"
on September 1, 2005, two months prior to sending the account to Superior.
Gittins Affidavit ^ 14, R. 31, 33-34. Lack of receipt is not necessarily inconsistent
with proper giving of notice. See Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley,
782 P.2d 536, 540-41 (Utah App.1989)).
The Webb decision does not translate into a requirement on the part of
Superior to notify Mr. Pett of an account assignment prior to suit. Webb stands for
the proposition that an assignee, to protect itself, must notify the obligor before
payment is made to the assignor. In other words, an obligor who is not notified of
an assignment and who pays the original obligee, is not liable to an unknown
assignee.
If the debt is to be discharged by payment to someone other than the
creditor because of. . . assignment, unambiguous notification of the
change must be given the debtor; otherwise, the debtor is entitled to
discharge the debt by paying the original creditor. A debtor, having
no notice of an assignment of the debt, cannot be held liable to pay
the same debt twice.
Webb, 972 P.2d at 77. Under Webb, if Mr. Pett had made a payment to the
Hospital for the anesthesia bill, he might nonetheless have a payment defense
(though it would be a stretch given the language of the Consent) if notice of
Inter West's involvement had not been sent. Mr. Pett has not asserted that such a
payment was made. Under Webb, if Mr. Pett had made a payment to InterWest on
this account before notice was given of the referral to Superior for collection, he
14

could defend Superior's suit to the extent the payment extinguished the debt.
Again, Mr. Pett does not claim to have made a payment to InterWest (or to
Superior or to anyone else on this account). The Webb decision does not help Mr.
Pett.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Weigh Evidence.
Mr. Pett claims that the trial court engaged in an impermissible exercise of
weighing evidence to arrive at a summary judgment. Judge Low's second
memorandum decision is quoted at length at pages 16-17 of the Brief of Appellant.
Neither these quotes nor any other inkling in the record shows that the court
weighed evidence - the court did not need to weigh evidence, because, as shown
above, there was no evidence to put on the scales opposite the essential material
facts demonstrating Superior's entitlement to a summary judgment.
The court sorted through the facts to determine which ones were material.
The court mentioned some of the facts it was disregarding as irrelevant. However,
this is not an exercise in balancing testimony or assessing credibility, but rather the
sharing of extensive reasoning for the court's legal determinations.

15

D. The Trial Court Viewed All Evidence Favorably Toward Mr. Pett
Mr. Pett's claims that the trial court failed to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to Mr. Pett. This assertion, re-quoting passages from the second
memorandum decision, is otherwise bare.
Due to the standard of review, this Court must also indulge Mr. Pett in any
reasonable inferences that favor him. As shown above, favorable illuminations and
liberal indulgences do not reveal or produce facts disruptive of the summary
judgment.
Point III
MR. PETT'S MOTION TO STRIKE WAS APPROPRIATELY REJECTED.
The trial court rejected Mr. Pett's motion to strike the Gittins Affidavit as
"late and inappropriate. Leave could have been requested by Defendant if he
sought to set aside the Court's memorandum decision or to otherwise attack the
judgment." R. 101. Under Rule 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to
strike is made "before responding to a pleading." Mr. Pett's motion to strike came
two weeks after his response to the affidavit and was therefore untimely under the
rules, if not on general principles of judicial economy.
Mr. Pett's motion to strike lacks merit. The Gittins Affidavit was based on
personal knowledge, no matter how much Mr. Pett wishes to argue. It showed the
basis of the affiant's personal knowledge, and demonstrated the reliability of the

16

business records which were attached and on which the testimony focused.
Accordingly any possible error in the trial court's procedural ruling would have
been harmless.
Point IV
SUPERIOR SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Superior was granted an award of $1,230.00 in attorney's fees by the trial
court. R. 95. As demonstrated above, the award was entirely appropriate, based on
a contractual provision. As such, Superior should also be awarded its attorney's
fees incurred on appeal, if it prevails.
"In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by statute or
contract. If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded in
accordance with the terms of that contract." Foster v. Montgomery,
2003 UT App 405,1m 12, 82 P.3d 191 (citations and quotations
omitted); see also Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs.,
617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) (holding that a contract provision for
attorney fees includes those incurred by the prevailing party on
appeal as well as at trial).... Olsen is the prevailing party on appeal
and, therefore, is awarded attorney fees on appeal. We remand to the
trial court for a determination of attorney fees reasonably incurred on
appeal.
Panos v. Olsen and Associates Const, Inc., 123 P.3d 816, 822 (Utah App. 2005).
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's summary judgment in all respects,
as well as its decision to reject the untimely motion to strike. The Court should
also award Superior its reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal, the amount
to be fixed by the trial court on remand.
Superior will also note that it appears that the facts and arguments have
adequately presented through the briefs and the record, such that, pursuant to Rule
29(a)(3) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the decisional process will not be
significantly aided by oral argument
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of January, 2008.
JONATHAN P. THOMAS^.C.

Jopdmetn P. Thomas

^-^

^tforney for Plaintiff/Appellee/Superior
CHRIS DAINES LAW

Chris Daines
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee/Superior
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